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Earlier studies of the impact of performance pay on individuals’ behavior have primarily been concerned 
with the effects on their earnings and productivity. The productivity increases associated with the adoption 
of performance pay practices may, however, come at the expense of quality of life at or outside work. In 
this paper we study the effect on the employees’ out-of-work activities, testing whether performance pay 
contracts lead to a “time squeeze” for non-work activities. In doing so, we distinguish between two 
effects, a substitution effect and a discretion effect. On the one hand, since the marginal payoff to work is 
higher under a performance pay contract, employees will work more and spend less time on private 
activities (substitution effect). On the other hand, to the extent that employees have some choice over their 
work hours, if employees are more productive they can do the same job in less time and have more spare 
time for private activities (discretion effect). We distinguish between those services that the employee can 
buy in the market (e.g., cleaning, cooking) and leisure activities (e.g., sports, cultural activities).  
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 1  Introduction 
 
Research on the impact of performance pay has mainly been concerned with its effects on 
earnings of individuals and performance of firms (Booth and Frank (1999); Lazear (2000) and 
Parent (1999); Freeman and Kleiner (2005); Shearer (2004)). Considerable less is known about 
other consequences of the introduction of performance pay, such as worker turnover, job 
satisfaction (Money and Graham (1999); Heywood and Wei (2006)) and competition between 
employees (Drago and Garvey (1998)).  Increased use of incentive pay schemes is frequently 
accompanied by changes in the design of jobs and work organizations. In particular, paying for 
performance typically means increasing the discretion of employees with respect to choice of 
methods, order and rate of work (Ortega, 2006). There is a small economic literature (and a large 
number of works in psychology and sociology) on how increased demands of work life affect job 
satisfaction (see Greene (2006) for a discussion and analysis) or the work-family life balance 
(Berg, Kalleberg and Appelbaum (2003)) and related time stress (Hamermesh and Lee, 
forthcoming). Investigations of how changes in compensation schemes spill over to other parts of 
individuals’ lives have, however, been thin on the ground. 
 
Our intention in this paper is to fill one of these gaps. More precisely, we focus on how 
performance pay affect employees’ private lives in terms of time available for housework 
(cooking, cleaning), taking care of children, elderly or disabled relatives, and sports, cultural and 
other leisure activities. In other words in our study we examine the extent to which performance 
related pay schemes contribute to the much discussed worsening of the “work/life balance” as it 
is called Europe (“time squeeze” is the term used in North America); see OECD (2004).  Our 
empirical analysis is based on the European Working Conditions Survey from year 2000, which 
  2provides us with a fairly rich data set on working conditions and individuals’ activities outside 
work in 27 European countries.  
 
The econometric study is guided by a stylized model of the Holmström-Milgrom’s (1991) multi-
task model variety. The model shows that the total effect of performance pay on private activities 
can be decomposed into a “substitution effect” (employees spend less time on private activities 
because better work performance leads to a higher bonus) and a “discretion effect” – with a 
performance pay contract employees are given more discretion over work hours and can choose 
to spend more or less time on private activities. In the empirical sections of the paper we first 
estimate the total effect of performance pay on private activities for male and female employees, 
and find that the effect is always positive or insignificant. Because this result is potentially 
subject to a selection bias, we use a differences approach which enables us to estimate the 
substitution effect. This alternative approach utilizes an interesting feature of the data – the 
information about employees’ discretion over work schedules. We find that female employees 
with a performance pay contract reduce the amount of time spent on almost all private activities, 
whereas male employees reduce the amount of time for all except charitable and political 
activities. 
 
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. Next the theoretical model and the 
hypotheses to be tested are presented and derived. Section 3 contains the data description. In the 
next two sections we report results from analyses using two different estimation approaches. 
Section 6 concludes. 
 
 
  32  Theory 
To guide the empirical analysis we use a stylized version of Holmström and Milgrom’s (1991) 
multi-task agency model. A firm is assumed to employ one individual whose work effort is not 
observable and is denoted by e. In addition the employee makes several choices outside work, 
which are denoted by A = h, L. First of all, she chooses the amount of housework and family-
related work that she wants to conduct. Such work is denoted by h and includes the amount of 
time that she spends cooking, taking care of her children or elderly relatives, and doing 
housework. Second, she can also hire housework services and thus spend less time on such 
activities. The amount of such services is denoted by x and their price is given by p. Finally, the 
employee chooses an amount of leisure, which is denoted by L and includes the amount of time 
spent on cultural activities, sports and other kinds of leisure. Her utility function has a constant 
absolute risk aversion coefficient equal to r: 
 
U = – exp { – r [ c + B( h + x ) + F( L ) – g ( e, h ) ]  } ,       ( 1 )  
 
where c is consumption, B(.) are the private benefits derived from housework, F(.) is the net 
utility of leisure, and g( ., .) is the cost of effort. We assume that housework services are a perfect 
substitute for the employee’s own housework effort: B = B( h + x ), with B’ > 0 and B’’ < 0. We 
also assume that F’ > 0 and F’’ < 0. As far as the cost function is concerned, all first and second 
partial derivatives are assumed to be positive, which in particular implies that e and h are 
substitutes in the utility function (complements in the cost function). The cost function is 
assumed to be quadratic: 
 
g(e, h) = e
2/2 + γh
2/2 + κeh          ( 2 )  
  4 
where γ, κ > 0. The employee’s budget constraint is given by c + px = w, where for simplicity 
the price of consumption has been normalized to one. In addition, we assume that time imposes a 
limit on the amount of work and out-of-work activities that the employee can carry out: 
specifically, e + h + L = 1.  The firm is assumed to be risk neutral, with profits given by (y – 
w), where y denotes value added and w employee compensation. Specifically, we assume that y = 
e + ε, where ε ~ N( 0, σ
2 ). 
 
As in Lazear (1986), we consider two different contractual arrangements. In the first one, the 
employee is paid through a performance pay contract, w = β + αy, and has discretion to choose 
the amount of effort (e) she wants to exert. Under the second arrangement she is paid a straight 
salary, i.e. w = β. Because in the latter case she would not have any incentive to work, the firm 
must supervise her in order to ensure that she works for a minimum amount of time or supplies a 
minimum level of work effort, which we denote by e. Thus. e is positively related to the extent of 
monitoring, and negatively related to the employee’s discretion.
1
 
Under a performance pay contract the employee maximizes the certainty equivalent 
 
β + αe – px + B( h + x ) + F( 1 – e – h ) – g( e, h ) – ( r/2 ) α
2 σ
2,     (3) 
 
with respect to e, h and x, which gives the following first-order conditions: 
 
α – F’( 1 – e – h ) – g1( e, h ) = 0         ( 4 )    
                                                 
1 The more the employee is supervised, the higher e and the lower her discretion. In particular, if there is no 
supervision, e = 0, which means that the employee is free to choose her preferred effort level. 
  5B’( h + x ) – F’( 1 – e – h ) – g2( e, h ) = 0        ( 5 )  
– p + B’( h + x ) = 0.            ( 6 )  
 
where g1 and g2 refer to the first partial derivatives of g with respect to the first and second 
arguments respectively. Combining these three conditions, we obtain 
 
α = F’( 1 – e – h ) + g1(e, h)            ( 7 )  






pp denote the optimal choices under this first contractual arrangement. Under 
the second contractual arrangement, the employee is paid a fixed salary (i.e., α = 0), and will 
choose the minimum amount of work effort (e). Therefore we will have 
 
0 < F’( 1  – e – h) + g1(e, h)            ( 9 )  
p = F’( 1 – e – h) + g2( e, h).           ( 1 0 )  
 




s to denote the optimal choices under this second contractual 
arrangement. Two other contractual arrangements are possible but will not be optimal: if there is 
a performance pay contract but the employee does not have discretion, i.e., she is closely 
monitored and must always choose the level of effort e, she will be inefficiently exposed to risk. 
Given that she is being monitored, the contract could be improved by paying her a fixed salary. 
The other suboptimal contract is the one where the employee is paid a fixed salary and has 
discretion to choose effort, for in that case she will choose a level of effort equal to zero. We can 
  6therefore concentrate on the two contracts (performance pay with discretion and salary pay 
without discretion) that can be optimal for some parameter values. 
 
Comparative statics for those two contracts are summarized in the following proposition (see 
Appendix A for the proof): 
 
Proposition:  
(a) Under a salary system, housework ( h
s ) is decreasing with respect to e. Moreover, leisure 
( L
s ) is decreasing with respect to e if and only if κ < γ. 
(b) Suppose the firm moves from a salary system to a performance pay system. If work effort 
increases ( e
pp > e ), then housework will diminish ( h
pp < h
s ). Furthermore, leisure will 
diminish ( L
pp < L
s ) if and only if κ < γ.  
 
Part (a) of the proposition characterizes the effect of increasing the extent of monitoring 
conditional on the employee being paid a straight salary, whereas part (b) characterizes the total 
effect of moving from a salary system (where the employee is forced to choose e) to a 
performance pay system (where the employee has freedom to choose e). 
 
Intuition for these results can be summarized as follows. Because of the multi-task nature of the 
problem, the marginal return of housework ( B’ – g2 ) must in equilibrium be equal to the 
marginal return of leisure ( F’ ). When moving from a salary system to a performance pay system 
(or when increasing the amount of supervision within a salary system), the employee increases 
work effort, which raises the marginal return of leisure. Hence, to go back to equilibrium, the 
marginal return of housework must increase and / or the marginal return of leisure must diminish. 
  7A reduction in housework will always achieve both goals: it will reduce the marginal return of 
leisure, and it will of course increase the marginal return of housework. As far as leisure is 
concerned, it must be noted that, since L = 1 – e – h, the effect of performance pay will depend 
on the increase in work effort relative to the reduction of housework. This will in turn be 
determined by the degree of substitutability between work and housework: in the case where 
work and housework are weak substitutes ( κ < γ ), a small reduction of housework will suffice to 
increase the marginal return of housework back to an equilibrium level. In that case, since the 
reduction of housework is relatively small compared to the increase in work effort, leisure will 
diminish. In contrast, if work and housework are strong substitutes ( κ > γ ), a large reduction of 
housework will be needed to increase the marginal return of housework back to an equilibrium 
level. In that case leisure will actually increase, because the reduction in housework is relatively 
large compared to the increase in work effort.  
 
Mathematically, note that the first-order conditions for housework imply 
 
p = F’( 1 – e
pp – h
pp ) + γh
pp + κe
pp         ( 1 1 )  
p = F’( 1 – e – h
s) + γh
s + κe          ( 1 2 )  
 
In the particular case where κ = γ these two conditions imply that h





s, i.e. performance pay has no effect on leisure. If κ > γ then the two conditions 
are satisfied if h
s + e > h
pp + e
pp, and therefore L
pp > L
s, i.e. performance pay increases the 
amount of leisure. Conversely, for κ < γ we must have h
s + e < h
pp + e
pp, which means that 




  8The model also shows that moving from a salary system to a performance pay system generates 
two different effects, a substitution effect and a discretion effect. Letting A = h or A = L, the total 




s(e) = [ A
pp – A
s(0) ] + [ A
s(0) – A




s(0) ] is the substitution effect and [ A
s(0) – A
s(e) ] is the discretion effect. 
 
The substitution effect means that if employees have discretion over their work hours (i.e. e = 0), 
performance pay contracts will have a negative influence on the amount of time dedicated to 
housework. This is due to the fact that when a performance pay contract is introduced the 
marginal benefit of work effort increases, i.e., every additional hour of work raises expected 
performance, leading to a higher expected bonus. Provided that the employee has some choice 
over work hours, she will cut out-of-work activities in order to have more time available for 
work. In the model, if the employee has discretion and is paid a straight salary, her equilibrium 
choice is given by the value of A
s that corresponds to the particular case where e = 0; whereas if 
she has discretion and a performance pay contract, her choice will be given by A
pp. Hence the 
proposition implies a negative substitution effect for housework ( A = h ) and a negative or 
positive substitution effect for leisure ( A = L ), depending on whether κ < γ (negative effect) or κ 
> γ (positive effect). 
  
The discretion effect has to do with the fact that when performance contracts are introduced, 
employees are typically given wider discretion over the choice of work hours, i.e., greater explicit 
incentives usually come hand in hand with greater discretion. Thus, under a salary system we will 
  9generally have e
s = e > 0 since the firm will want to ensure a minimum level of effort. If the 
employee was free to choose the amount of time devoted to work and was being paid a fixed 
salary, we would have e
s = e = 0 instead. Part (a) of the proposition implies that the discretion 
effect will always be positive for housework ( A = h
 ), and will be positive for leisure ( A = L ) if 
and only if κ < γ.  
 
3  Data description 
Data used here come from the third European Working Conditions Survey, which was carried out 
for the 15 old member states in 2000 and for the 12 candidate member states in 2001. The data 
are a cross-section of more than 24,000 employees representing all industries and occupational 
groups. The data set has information on performance pay, discretion and private activities. An 
individual is defined to receive performance pay if she receives any of the following payments: 
piece rate or productivity payments, payments based on the overall performance of the company 
she works in (profit sharing) and income from shares in the company she is working for. As can 
be seen from Table 1, piece rates and profit sharing are clearly the most prevalent performance 
pay schemes. All in all, 16.4 per cent of the employees receive at least one form of performance 
pay. 
 
Table 1. Performance pay 
Variable Mean  Std.  dev.  N 
1. Piece rates  .105  .306  27,083 
2. Group Performance Pay  .024  .154  27,083 
3. Profit sharing  .056  .230  27,083 
4. Stock ownership  .009  .094  27,083 
Performance pay: (1)+(2)+(3)+(4)  .164  .402  27,083 
 
  10As for outside work activities the questionnaire asks the respondents on a scale from 0 (never) to 
5 (every day for at least one hour) about the frequency of their involvement in several different 
types of activities: voluntary or charitable activity, political/trade union activity, caring for and 
educating your children, cooking, housework, caring for elderly/disabled relatives, taking a 
training or education course, sporting activity, cultural activity and leisure activity. In our 
empirical analysis, reported below, we will not consider educational activities as for some 
respondents these may involve training for their jobs. As can be seen from Table 2, participation 
in political/trade union activities is rare as is involvement in charitable and taking care of disabled 
or elderly relatives, too. Not surprisingly, the most prevalent outside work activities are 
housework, child care, cooking and “other leisure”, followed by sports and cultural activities. 
 
Table 2. Outside work activities, by gender 
Men Women 
Activity 
Mean  Std.  
dev.  Median N Mean  Std.  
dev.  Median N 
1. Cooking  2.384  1.852 3  13,573  4.279 1.259  5  13,119 
2. Housework  2.587  1.779 3  13,598  4.369 1.074  5  13,172 
3. Children care  2.321  2.248 3  11,618  2.899 2.340  5  11,427 
4. Disabled/elderly  .513  1.209 0  12,213  .815 1.509  0  11,724 
5. Charity  .533  1.035 0  13,363  .537 .988  0  12,766 
6. Political  .227  .711 0  13,306  .146 .550  0  12,723 
7. Sport  1.607  1.619 2  13,445  1.350 1.589  0  12,795 
8. Cultural  1.063  1.256 1  13,456  1.134 1.218  1  12,861 
9. Leisure  2.590  1.565 3  13,543  2.394 1.577  3  12,932 
 
Note.- For each out-of work activity there are six possible responses: “never” (0); “once or twice per year” 
(1); “once or twice per month” (2); “once or twice a week” (3); “every day or every second day for 
less than one hour” (4); “every day for at least one hour” (5). 
 
  11Since theory suggests distinguishing between private activities for which the market provides a 
close substitute and those for which no market substitute really exists, we use the information 
available to construct four different indexes (see Table 3). The first one, “HouseIndex”, is defined 
as the sum of the variables referring to cooking and housework. Both are activities for which the 
market can provide very close substitutes. The second index is called “FamilyCareIndex” and 
measures the frequency with which respondents spend time taking care of their children or 
elderly / disabled relatives. These are activities for which the market provides substitutes which 
however are not as close as the ones for cooking and housework. The third and fourth indexes 
capture non-work activities for which the market cannot provide a substitute: “CharipolIndex” 
includes charitable and political activities, and “LeisureIndex” includes sports, cultural and other 
leisure activities.
2 The reason for using two different indices for these activities is that in the 
former case it could be argued that some market substitution would be possible (i.e., donating 
money to charitable organizations or political associations), whereas in the latter case such 
substitution is simply impossible. Since the response options for the frequency of out-of-work 
activities do not increase linearly, we use a non-linear scale reflecting how many times per year 
the employee participates in each kind of activity to compute the indexes. Thus, in that scale the 
response “never” is quantified as zero; “once or twice per year” as 1.5; “once or twice per month” 
as 18 (i.e., 1.5*12); “once or twice a week” as 72 (i.e., 1.5*12*4); “every day or every second 
day for less than one hour” as 273.75 (i.e., 0.75*365); and “every day for at least one hour” as 
730 (i.e., 2*365).  
 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the four indexes computed with that scale. Given that the 
two highest response options refer to the frequency and duration of the activity, whereas the other 
                                                 
2 Since LeisureIndex includes three different variables, we normalize the sum to make sure that the range for this 
index is the same as for the other indexes, which include only two variables each.  
  12ones refer only to the frequency, the values for the two highest options are arguably open to some 
discussion. In particular, the highest response option could take on a higher value, since the 
questionnaire does not specify any upper bound on duration.
3 Another possibility would be to 
collapse the highest two responses into one, so that the resulting measure would only convey 
information on frequency (i.e., no information on duration). We have carried out sensitivity 
checks by changing the scale in these ways. Results reported in the next two sections are robust 
to both types of changes. 
 
Table 3. Indexes of outside work activities, by gender 
Men Women 
Activity 
Mean  Std.  
Dev.  N Mean  Std.  
dev.  N 
HouseIndex 382.172 493.644 13,512 1057.564 517.037  13,092
FamilyCareIndex 283.471 353.054 10,756 432.607 398.372 10,550
CharipolIndex 23.404 109.737 13,194 16.947 85.899  12,607
LeisureIndex 178.292 247.531 13,199 152.167 226.330  12,563
 
 
We will also make use of total hours worked (per week) as a dependent variable. This is 
constructed from answers in the questionnaire concerning the number of weekly hours usually 
worked in main job, plus for those who beside their main job have another regular job, the usual 
weekly hours in this secondary job. The Survey also has a number of questions concerning 
discretion, and the information we use emanates from a question whether the employee can 
influence her working hours or not. In addition, we use a number of control variables summarized 
                                                 
3 Indeed, the highest response is actually the median response of females for cooking, housework, and children care 
(see Table 2), and it is not unreasonable to assume that such responses correspond to more than two hours of activity 
per day. 
  13in Table 4 below, as well as industry, country and occupation dummies.
4 Not surprisingly, men 
work more hours and are more often employed on permanent contracts and the main income 
earner in the household. Furthermore, men have somewhat more discretion regarding work hours 
than women. 
 
Table 4. Summary statistics of discretion, work hours, and main control variables 
Men Women 
Variable 
Mean  Std. 
dev.  N Mean  Std. 
dev.  N 
Discretion over work hours  .348 .476 13,666 .327 .469  13,089
Hours worked (per week)  41.105 10.252 13,671 35.823 11.849  13,132
Household size  2.111 1.343 13,824 2.078 1.297  13,255
Main income earner  .780 .414 13,728 .416 .493  13,133
Married .593 .491 13,786 .562 .496  13,194
Part-time contract  .066 .248 13,826 .249 .432  13,257
Permanent contract  .823 .381 13,670 .797 .402  13,086
Age 38.447 11.249 13,826 38.060 10.930  13,257
 
 
4  Estimates of the determinants of private activities 
In this section we report estimates from linear regressions
5 for the different private activities. We 
estimate the models for men and women separately, using systems of seemingly unrelated 
regression equations. The key explanatory variable of interest is the dummy for performance pay. 
In addition the models also include a set of control variables: the individual’s age, marital status, 
whether she is the main income earner in the household, household size, whether she is employed 
                                                 
4 Industries and occupations are defined at one-digit level. 
5 We have also run estimations of ordered probit models. However, since these cannot be estimated as a system of 
seemingly unrelated regression equations and because using them does not make use of real information about the 
time used on different activities, we prefer the linear specification. 
  14on a permanent /fixed-term and on a full-time/part-time contract, and the individual’s occupation, 
industrial affiliation and country of residence.  
 
The estimation results are given in Tables 5 and 6 for men and women, respectively. (To save 
space, the occupation, industry and country dummy estimates are omitted).  We can see that for 
men performance pay is associated with more charitable and political activities, and more leisure 
activities. There is no significant effect on “house-related” (cooking and housework) activities. 
As far as women are concerned, performance pay does not have a significant effect on any of the 
private activities.  
 
Table 5. Seemingly unrelated regressions, male employees 
   HouseIndex FamilyCareIndex CharipolIndex  LeisureIndex
























































N 10,170  10,170  10,170  10,170 
R-squared .195  .267  .026  .088 
 
Note. Standard errors are shown in parentheses. Levels of significance: (***) 1 percent; (**) 5 
percent; (*) 10 percent. All regressions include 26 country dummies, 8 occupation dummies, 11 
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Table 6. Seemingly unrelated regressions, female employees 
   HouseIndex FamilyCareIndex CharipolIndex  LeisureIndex
























































N 9,896  9,896  9,896  9,896 
R-squared .188  .259  .017  .101 
 
Note. See Table 5. 
 
Table 7 reports the same regression model with total number of hours worked as the dependent 
variable. This is estimated on samples for individuals with and without discretion and with and 
without performance pay, separately by gender. In the first case the key explanatory variable is 
performance pay, and in the other it is discretion (i.e., ability to choose work hours). The other 
explanatory variables entered are the same as in Tables 3 and 4, and are not reported in the table.  
 
It can be seen that both men and women who have discretion with respect to their working hours 
work more when they receive performance pay. Women also work more if paid according to 
performance even though they cannot choose their working hours. This likely indicates that full-
time jobs are more associated with performance related pay schemes than part-time jobs. When 
 
 
  16Table 7. Regressions for total number of work hours; coefficients to “performance pay” (columns 
(1) and (2)) and “choose hours” ((3) and (4)) 
 






















 -.135  
(.190) 
 
Note. See Table 5.  
 
the data is cut according to the nature of pay schemes, as in columns (3) and (4),  it is found that 
men who can choose working hours work more irrespectively of whether they are paid for 
performance or not. For women, there is no difference in the impact of discretion between those 
who receive performance pay and those who do not.  
 
One potential problem with the estimations shown in this section is due to unobserved ability 
differences. If more able employees are more likely to have performance pay contracts, as 
predicted by models that allow for sorting, (see e.g., Lazear (2000)), and if ability is correlated 
with private activities – an assumption which is not implausible – then our estimates will be 
biased. The next section addresses this issue. 
 
5  Estimates from a differences approach 
The Survey includes several questions on employee discretion and one in particular where 
individuals report whether they have freedom to choose their work hours (see Table 4). Thus we 
observe the amount of out-of-work activities performed by four different types of employees: 
those with a performance pay contract and discretion over work hours, those with a performance 
pay contract and no discretion over work hours, and those with a salary contract with or without 
discretion over work hours.  
  17 
The estimation strategy we call the differences approach uses this information as follows. We cut 
the data into four different categories. The first category consists of all employees who have no 
discretion in their choice of work hours. The second category includes all employees with 
discretion, and categories three and four have all employees without and with performance pay 
contracts, respectively. Of the total sample 56 per cent had neither discretion nor performance 
pay. Another relatively large category is those with discretion but no performance pay; their share 
is 27.6 per cent. 10.3 per cent are on performance pay contracts but lack discretion with respect to 
work hours, and the remaining 6.1 per cent have discretion as well as performance pay. 
 
We run four regressions, one for each of the above-mentioned categories of employees, as shown 
in Table 8: to keep the same notation as in Section 2, we use A to refer to the amount of private 
activities (A = h, L). The performance pay and discretion dummies are denoted by PP and D 
respectively, and control variables are denoted by X. Error terms are given by c and ε, where ci is 
the part of the error term correlated with performance pay (for i = 1, 2) or discretion (for i = 3, 
4), and εi is the part of the error term which is uncorrelated with performance pay (for i = 1, 2) or 
discretion (for i = 3, 4). 
 
In principle there may be some selection bias in all four regressions. However, even in the 
presence of bias we expect private activities to be more sensitive to performance pay when the 
employee has more freedom to choose her work hours than when she lacks freedom, provided 
that the size of the biases is similar in the two cases. Thus the coefficient of performance pay 
must be higher (in absolute value) in regression 2 than in regression 1. Similar reasoning applies 
to the coefficient for discretion over work hours: private activities must be more sensitive to 
  18 
   
Table 8. Regressions needed for the differences approach 
 




1  A1 = α1 + β1*PP1 + θ1 X1 + c1 + ε1 D = 0  β1 = A
pp(e) – A
s(e) 
2  A2 = α2 +  β2*PP2 +  θ2 X2+ c2 + ε2 D = 1  β2 = A
pp(0) – A
s(0) 
3  A3 = α3 +  β3*D3 + θ3 X3 + c3 + ε3 PP = 0  β3 = A
s(0) – A
s(e) 




discretion when the employee is paid a fixed salary than in the case where she has a performance 
pay contract: in the latter case she will be less inclined to increase the amount of time spent on 
private activities, for the opportunity cost (the negative effect on her bonus) is higher. We can 
therefore use the differences β2 – β1 and β4 – β3 to obtain cleaner estimates of the effects on 
private activities. More precisely, if selection biases are similar in equations 1 and 2 and 
equations 3 and 4, this approach enables us to difference out the selection bias. It should of 
course be noted that, because of the differencing, some information is lost: specifically, the 
estimates obtained in this way measure the substitution effect, rather than the total effect (see 
Appendix B for details). 
 
To obtain estimates of the differences β2 – β1 and β4 – β3, we estimate the following two 
equations:  
A = αI + βI*PP + θI X + γI*D + δI*D*PP + λI DX + cI + εI      ( 1 4 )  
A = αII + βII*D + θII X + γII*PP + δII*PP*D + λIID X + cII + εII     (15) 
  19 
where control variables ( X ) are the same as in previous regressions (household size, main 
income earner dummy, marital status dummy, part-time contract dummy, permanent-contract 
dummy, age, 26 country dummies, 8 occupation dummies, and 11 industry dummies). The 
parameters of interest, which measure the substitution effects, are δI and δII respectively, where δI 
= β2 – β1 and δII = β4 – β3. As in the previous section, we estimate separate regressions for male 
and female employees, using the seemingly unrelated regression equations approach. Estimates 
of the parameters of interest are given in Table 10. The first thing to be noted is that for both 
males and females the signs of the substitution effects are the same when the estimation relies on 
the performance pay coefficient and when it relies on the discretion coefficient (i.e., in general 
the estimates for δI and δII have the same sign). There are only two out of eight cases where the 





Table 10. Substitution effects, males and females 
Men Women   
Activity  δI δII δI δII

































Note.- Estimation results for equations (14) and (15). Standard errors are shown in 
parentheses. Levels of significance: (***) 1 percent; (**) 5 percent; (*) 10 percent.  
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As far as male employees are concerned, we find a significant negative effect of performance pay 
on leisure, and no significant effect for the other activities. For female employees we find a 
negative effect on house-related activities as well as on charitable and political activities. Based 
on the theory, we expected the substitution effect to be always negative for those services that the 
employee could to some extent hire in the market. In our data, the housework index would fall in 
this category, and we find the results for both male and female employees to be in accordance 
with the theory, i.e., when significant the substitution effects are negative (see Table 10). Taking 
care of family members can also be considered a service that employees can hire in the market, 
but in that case we do not find significant effects for either male or female employees. This is 
consistent with the fact that for those activities the market provides more imperfect substitutes 
than for housework. We therefore should not expect strong substitution effects there. The two 
remaining indexes (charitable and political activities and leisure activities) can be classified as 
“leisure” (L in the model). In this case the theory is consistent with both positive and negative 
effects, and the data show that all significant effects are negative. The results also show important 
differences between male and female employees – significant effects for men and insignificant 
effects for women.  
 
Thus, all in all, the propositions in our theoretical analysis are broadly supported by the 
estimation results. Moreover, the estimates imply that performance pay schemes seem to be 
associated with a cost in form of less time spent on cooking, housework, charity, sports, political 
activities and leisure. 
 
  216 Conclusions 
Using a large cross section of European employees, we have studied the effect of performance 
pay contracts on the time that employees spend on private activities. Theory suggests a 
substitution effect whereby employees with a performance pay contract devote less time to 
private activities for which it is possible to hire services in the market (e.g. housework, children 
care). In addition, there is a discretion effect whereby, if employees have some choice over work 
hours, they can choose to do their work in less time and have more spare time for private 
activities. 
 
We conduct two empirical analyses. First of all we estimate the total effect of performance pay 
(i.e. the sum of the substitution and discretion effects). We estimate separate regressions for male 
and female employees and find that the total effect is always positive or insignificant. The second 
empirical analysis exploits an interesting feature of the data – the information about discretion 
over work hours. We use a differences approach to control for selection bias and estimate the 
substitution effect in two different ways. We find evidence of a negative substitution effect for 
both male and female employees. Consequently, our results suggest that the increased adoption 
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The first-order conditions under the salary system imply that 
p = F’( 1 – e – h
s ) + g2( e , h
s )         ( A 1 )  
If e increases, then both g2( e , h
s ) and F’( 1 – e – h
s ) will increase. Therefore for (A1) to be 
satisfied we need h
s to diminish. Differentiating (A1) with respect to e we obtain: 
δh
s / δe = − [ g21( e , h
s ) – F’’( 1 – e – h
s ) ] / [  g22( e , h
s ) – F’’( 1 – e – h
s ) ].    (A2) 
 
Furthermore, since L
s = 1 – e – h
s, the amount of leisure L
s will diminish with e if and only if   
 
| δh
s / δe | < 1. From (A2), this is satisfied when g21( e , h
s ) < g22( e , h
s ), i.e. κ < γ.  
 
Part (b): 
The first-order conditions under the two contractual arrangements imply that 
p = F’( 1 – e
pp – h
pp ) + g2( e
pp, h
pp )         ( A 3 )  
p = F’( 1 – e – h
s ) + g2( e , h
s )         ( A 1 )  
If e













Table A1 shows the four regression equations and the expected value of the estimator of interest, 
under the assumption that there is a selection bias in all four equations:  
 
Table A1. The estimation equations 
 
Regression equation  Expected value of estimator 
1  A1 = α1 + β1*PP1 + θ1 X1 + c1 + ε1 E( β1 ) = A
pp(e) – A
s(e) +  (PP1’PP1)
-1 E(PP1’c1) 














The differences approach relies on the assumption that the biases are equal in the first and second 
regressions and in the third and fourth regressions respectively, i.e. 
 
(PP1’PP1)
-1 E(PP1’c1) = (PP2’PP2)
-1 E(PP2’c2)       ( A 4 )  
(D3’D3)
-1 E(D3’c3) = (D4’D4)
-1 E(D4’c4)        ( A 5 )  
 
This condition will be satisfied if the correlation between performance pay and the unobserved 
determinants of private activities (e.g., ability) is the same for employees with and without 
discretion; and similarly, if the correlation between discretion and any unobserved determinants 
of private activities is the same for employees with and without a performance pay contract. If 
  26condition (A4) is satisfied, then using OLS the difference between the two performance pay 
coefficients will be an unbiased estimator of { [A
pp(0) – A
s(0)] −  [A
pp(e) – A
s(e)] }. Since A
pp(e) = 
A
s(e), this expression is equal to the substitution effect, A
pp(0) – A
s(0). Likewise, if condition (A5) 
is satisfied, so that selection biases are the same in regressions 3 and 4, using OLS the difference 
between the two discretion coefficients will be equal to { [A
s(0) – A
s(e)] −  [A
pp(0) – A
pp(e)] } and 
since A
pp(e) = A
s(e), this will also be equal to the substitution effect, A
pp(0) – A
s(0).   
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